An Introduction to the Administrative Process by Stone, Ferdinand F.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 6 Number 3 Article 2 
4-1-1952 
An Introduction to the Administrative Process 
Ferdinand F. Stone 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Ferdinand F. Stone, An Introduction to the Administrative Process, 6 U. Miami L. Rev. 281 (1952) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol6/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 6 APRIL, 1952 NUMBER 3
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS*
FERDINAND F. STONE**
I
No one knows precisely what was in the minds of our forefathers
when they framed the Constitution for these United States. The document
must speak for itself and when it stutters it must speak through the lips of
the Supreme Court. However, we can assume that our forefathers were
concerned lest the new government as set up become merely a substitute
tyranny for that which they saw in the rule of Great Britain; that they con-
sidered that the powers wrested from Great Britain belonged to the states
and the people, who, in turn, delegated certain of these powers to the central
government. We know also that they viewed the functioning of government,
as Caesar had earlier viewed Gaul, as divided into three parts: the legislative,
the executive and the judicial powers. In this division they had the support
of theory and pratice among civilized states. Lest these powers be exercised
arbitrarily, our forefathers devised an elaborate system of checks and
balances as insurance against tyranny. It is because of this system of checks
and balances, rather than because of its tri-partite form, that the new con-
stitution became a model for other nations and a landmark in constitutional
development.
This division of government into a legislature, an executive and a judi-'
ciary adequately described the business at hand in the world of the late
eighteenth century and indeed for many years thereafter. Government was
a relatively simple business in a society which was by our standards singularly
uncomplicated. Laws passed by the early legislatures usually dealt with
particular problems and prescribed for them fairly precise cures. It is some-
times erroneously believed that administrative law and the administrative
process are relatively recent problems. This is true in the sense that in our
time they have become celebrated and controverted issues. It is not true
in the sense of describing a new function of government, since from the
beginning our government has been concerned with the administration of
*For some time, I have sought an article which would serve to introduce the
student quickly to some of the maior ideas involved in the federal administrative process.
The literature on the whole field is immense, but much of it is too detailed to serve for
introduction. Since I have found no such article, I determined to write one myself.
**Professor of Law and Director of The Institute of Comparative Law, Tulane
University.
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law.1 However, in 1789, the administration of law was conceived as a
subordinate task performed by one or more of the existing branches of
government. Much of that which is now done by administrative agencies
was then performed either on the state or municipal level or left to be resolved
by individual action.2 In our time, as we know, administration has become
a major function of government, touching at vital points the life of each
citizen, trespassing in a sense upon the precincts of the old established areas
of governmental power, and blurring to some extent the clear-cut separation
of powers. The phenomenon is not, however, one of novelty, but rather
of complexity.
3
It is not alone in the field of government that administration has
become a worrisome child. It is a mark of our age that administration
has grown to be one of the most important expressions of our activity
This might be called the age of the fact finders and the administrators. The
gathering of facts has for some become confused with the acquisition of
wisdom. The arranging of facts has for some come to pass for the develop-
ment of policy. To call a man a "good administrator" is in many minds
to accord him that high praise formerly associated with calling a man a
L"great statesman." In the field of business enterprise, we hear the remark
that owners are easy to find but management is "hard to come by."' In
various fields of endeavor, we have come to place a high value upon admin-
istrative ability and success in our appraisal of men, so that it is not unusual
to hear it said of a man that he has the brains and the wisdom but what
is really needed in the job is a good administrator. This is the climate of
opinion in which in government we have come to find that the administrators
1. "In the Federal realm, as is well known, the administrative process may be
traced in an unbroken line from 1789, the first year of government under the Constitu-
tion of the United States." CELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINCS 4 (1941).
2. As A.A. Bearle, Jr. wrote in 1917, "There is a desire, even a clamor, for public
regulation, state or national, in matters which before the Civil War the nation conceived
concerned only the persons directly interested." Berle, The Expansion of American
Administrative Law, 30 HARv. L. Rnv. 430 (1917). Both sides of the Atlantic saw
this change. See Dicey, The Development of Administrative Law in England, 31 L.Q.
REV. 148, 149 (1915).
3. "If the American lawyer takes an increasing interest in Administrative Law it is
because he associates it with the fact that he has more and more occasion to attend
to the interests of his clients in government departments and before commissions which
claim to administer law without pretending to be courts of justice." FREuND, ThE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 16 (1923). See Frankfurter's statement, "Admin-
istrative Law has not come like a thief in the night. It is not an innovation; its general
recognition is." Frankfurter, Foreword, 47 YALE L.J. 515, 517 (1938).
4. Goodnow opens his treatise by saying, "The most striking if not the most impor-
tant questions of public law and the first to demand solution are those to which the
name 'constitutional' is applied. To their solution the wisdom and political activity of
the past have been devoted. The present age, however, is devoting itself primarily to
questions which are generally referred to as 'administrative'." GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES
OF THE ADMINISRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1905).
See such studies as BERLE AND MEANS, THE.MoDERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); Dodd, The Modern Corporation, Private Property and Recent Federal
Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1941); Washington, The Corporation Executive's
Living Wage, 54 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1941).
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are no longer thought of as an army of clerks and minor officials; adminis-
tration has become the daily business of powerful and important figures.
In times of emergency we find government and business vying for the
services of key administrators.
The story of how all this came about in the United States is the story
of the growth of our country, of the industrial revolution and the factory
system, of the vanishing frontier and the crowding of cities, of the concen-
tration of wealth and the rise of monopoly, of the maturing into practice of
certain ideals of our democracy and of the facts of a general economic
depression and mobilization for two world wars. Some writers have tried
to set out in orderly fashion the cause of these changes but the problem,
like the chicken-egg priority, defies much orderly analysis. Some like to
attempt to tie it up with dates, such as the Supreme Court's decision in
Munn v. IllinoisO or the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in 1887, 7 but these are but peaks in a slowly rising plateau. Still
others say that all went well until the establishment of the alphabetical
agencies of the "New Deal,"8 but that was only the proverbial straw
which broke the camel's back. A few valiant souls admit that like Topsy
the administrative phenomenon "Just growed."0
The results of its development are easier to state, at least as they
concern government. State and federal governments are today engaged in
the control and regulation of many fields of economic activity which were
formerly largely self-regulating. 10 In the main, these are businesses classi-
fied as affected with a public interest such as railroads, air lines, communi-
cations and public utilities. Further, short of the step of declaring the
business affected with a public interest, state and federal governments have
become interested in the control and regulation of specific functions per-
formed by business, such as the setting of wages, collective bargaining, social
security, prices, securities and form of enterprise, to name but a few examples.
Again, government itself has entered into certain areas of activities hitherto
occupied almost exclusively by private enterprise, such as insurance, housing,
money lending, defense and war production and the generation of electric
power. Then too, the ordinary business of government, witness the collection
of taxes, has grown more complex as the society itself became more de-
veloped. Finally, we may note the increased tendency on the part of
legislatures to concern themselves with the formulation of policy in general
6. 94 U.S. 113 (18761.
7. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. c. 1 (1946).
8. Jacob M. Lashly wrote in 1939, "there are now some 130 of these instrumentali-
ties of government, employing in one capacity or another about 850,000 people. It is
reported that one of the executive agencies alone decided over 600,000 separate contro-
versies, while during a corresponding period the aggregate of cases decided by all of the
federal courts of the country was less than 150,000." Lashly, Administrative Law and
the Bar, 25 VA. L. REv. 641, 647 (1939).
9. A thesis vigorously scouted in BEcic, OUR WONDERLAND OF BUREAUCRACY 91
(R93i: See generally FREUND, op. cit. supra note 3.
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outlines, leaving to subordinate agencies the actual implementation of the
ideas into concrete rules. These are by no means all of the results, but they
will serve to indicate the problem and suggest other examples.
Standing off and viewing the picture from another side, we can see
the wearing away of certain ideas long held about law in general. In
some instances this represents the correction of an idea which was unsound;
in others it represents a more fundamental shift in opinion. For example,
despite experience, the attitude had been widely indulged by laymen that
laws, once written down and enacted by legislatures, were practically self-
executing. The assumption that all laws are clear and capable of only one
meaning is as groundless as the assumption that all words have an agreed
meaning content and hence that ambiguity or misunderstanding cannot
arise. Under such a concept of law, administration of law was considered to
be an essentially mechanical process and administrative officials as mere
clerks. If indeed this were ever so, certainly it is not true today. Despite
advances in technical skill in the drafting of legislation, despite the fact that
many acts include sections defining the terms used therein, there is a wide
area left in which the modern administrator must act even though legislative
meaning may be debated and courts have not yet authoritatively determined
meanings.
Under our system, it is usually contemplated that the administrator
will make the initial interpretation and act under it even though his inter-
pretation may later be invalidated by court action." He cannot seek an
advisory opinion from a court; 2 neither has the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure aided him materially.'3 This has meant that the administrator
through his necessity of interpreting acts which lie administers has come
to exercise an important policy function. 14 We need only refer to the
interpretations and rulings of the Collector of Internal Revenue or the
Federal Security Administrator as examples of the importance of this
function.
Another idea which is succumbing to experience is the belief that
legislatures, meeting at stated periodic times, can provide adequately for
future problems. In the debates on the Federal Constitution, the delegates
expressed concern lest the federal legislature meet too often, 15 but today
11. "Interpretation by way of adjudication, manifestly, is interpretation after the
event; but the adequate functioning of the administrative process requires that much
interpretation precede the event." LANDIs, THE AnMINISTRATIVE PRocEss 80 (1938).
12. For a recent statement of the Court's position see Coffman v. Breeze Corps.,
323 U.S. 316 (1945).
13. This does not mean that the procedure itself is defective, but only that it has
been sparingly used. On the whole subject see BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDMENTS
875 et seq. (2d ed. 1941); Borehard, Declaratory judgments in Administrative Law, 11
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 139 (1933); Comment, Declaratory Judgments and Administrative
Agencies, I5 TEMP. L.Q. 139 (1940).
14. See generally LANmis, op. cit. sufra note 11, at 55 et seq.
15. "Mr. King could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every
year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much." 3 MADIsoN's PAPERS
1246 (1842).
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we find a growing doubt as to whether the legislature should adjourn at
all, so great and demanding has its business become. Problems do not
remain static between legislative sessions: neither do they declare a mora-
torium merely because the legislature is concerned with other matters of
consequence. Legislatures have used two principal methods for dealing
with future problems. One has been to attempt to anticipate by detailed
legislation all the problems which are likely to arise in the foreseeable
future. Such a method becomes not only cumbersome in detail but
requires better than usual crystal balls for prediction.16 A second method
involves the legislature contenting itself with laying down general standards,
policies and limitations and entrusting to administrative agencies the task
of applying the policies to day-by-day problems as they develop. This latter
method has been used increasingly. It has greatly enhanced the importance
of the administrator as the day-by-day "quasi-legislator."
Still a further idea which has been undergoing change is the notion
that legislation is primarily directed to problems which have already arisen
and become bothersome enough to require direct action. This is the old
thesis that legislatures act to cure evils but are only mildly interested in
preventing them. Much modem legislation is planning type legislation. The
approach is to a whole area of activity rather than to specific facets and
the emphasis is upon the future. Sometimes the planning is detailed;
sometimes it merely sketches generally the plan, leaving the administrator
to put in the details. Planning for the future usually presupposes a policy
and policy usually grounds itself upon a theory, and hence the administrator
is sometimes left with considerable latitude as to both theory and policy.
Legislative direction to an administrator to preserve "fair methods of com-
petition" or to take steps against "unreasonable restraints upon commerce"
or "unfair labor practices" are illustrations in point.
From whatever causes it arose, the fact remains that the rise of the
administrator in government to a position of power and influence was such
that he could no longer be regarded as a subordinate cog in a tri-partite
wheel. His rise to that position has not gone unchallenged and it is with
the challenges that we must now concern ourselves.
II
The administrative process has been attacked by many challenges. Not
all of them have been successful but each for a certain time has held the
16. As an example of the difficulty, we may look to the history of the Federal
Trade Commission. On January 20, 1914, President Wilson addressed both houses of
Congress saying, "Surely we are sufficiently familiar with the actual processes and methods
of monopoly and of the many hurtful restraints of trade to make definition possible, at
any rate up to the limit of what experience has disclosed. These practices, being now
abundantly disclosed, can be explicitly and item by item, forbidden by statute." But
as the historian of the Federal Trade Commission points out, the statutes which resulted"were rather a victory for those who doubted the efficacy of legislative codification, and
placed their reliance instead upon the development of rules and precedents by the
gradual process of interpretation and decision of controversies by administrative and
judicial tribunals." HENDERsoN, Ths FEDERAL TRU CoMMIssION 23, 48 (1924).
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limelight of public attention. For example, it has been said that the
administrative process is in fact a "headless 'fourth branch' of the Gov-
ernment, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated
powers" which does "violence to the basic theory of the American Constitu-
tion that there should be three major branches of the Government and
only three." Despite the strength of the language here used, this was no
demagogic outcry but was said by a distinguished committee in its report
to the President.' It is of course true that the Constitution did not provide
for a fourth branch of the government to be called the administrative
power, but, as Mr. Landis has written, "in terms of political theory, the
administrative process springs from the inadequacy of a simple tri-partite
form of government to deal with modern problems."1 8 Like the child born
out of wedlock, it is a real entity: to call it illegitimate does not affect its
existence in fact, it merely gives it a label. For the purpose of this essay,
it is sufficient to say that the process has withstood this attack and continues
to function. Debate as to whether it is a "fourth branch" or a "mongrel"
will continue to interest the theorists.
The constitutionality of the administrative process has also been
questioned as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. For
example, it has been charged that some agencies perform quasi-legislative,
quasi-judicial and quasi-executive powers, so that functions of two or
more of the traditional branches of government are united in the same
agency. The separation of powers doctrine is an old one.'9 Montesquieu
had warned that "when the legislative and the executive powers are united
in the same person or in the same body of magistracy, there can be no
liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."20
By way of example, Massachusetts can be cited in that her constitution
provides that "the legislative department shall never exercise the executive
or judicial powers, or either of them." 2' The Federal Constitution placed
the legislative power in the Congress, the executive power in the President
and the judicial power in the federal judiciary, but it did not in so many
words provide against their blending. It was specifically raised in objection
to the new Constitution that "the several departments of power are dis-
tributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry
17. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 36 (1937).
18. LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1.
19. Berle remarks that "however the theory of division of powers may stand as a
philosophical proposition, it is firmly engrafted into American law, primarily by constitu-
tional provisions, and secondarily and more effectively by five generations' habit of legal
reasoning." BERLE, supra note 2, at 433. See also Parker, Separation of Powers Revisited:
Its Meaning to Administrative Process, 49 MicH. L. REV. 1009 (1951) where the author
concludes that "it is perhaps inaccurate to speak of separation of powers as a basic
constitutional principle. All that is left of it seems to be an expedient of governmental
procedure."
20. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws Bk. XI, c. 6 (Nugent's transl. 1900).
21. MASS. CoNsr. Art. XXX, § 31.
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and beauty of form." Madison defended against this attack by resorting
to the words of Montesquieu himself and to his admiration of the British
Constitution, where indeed it could not be said that the departments
were kept totally separate and distinct from one another.
-2
In defense of our system it is argued that the liberty of which Montes-
quieu spoke and which it was in the minds of our forefathers to guard
was in our Constitution protected not by a sealing off of each department
from the others but by providing for the harmonization of these powers,
usefully exerted together, and kept from arbitrariness by the system of
checks and balances provided for each upon the others. The constitutional
argument of doctrinal separation of powers is more often appealed to than
described. The great decisions of the Supreme Court, in cases where the
argument has been raised, seem to exhibit less concern for the mechanical
departmentalizing of powers than for giving effect to those checks and
balances which can preserve us against tyranny.23 As Mr. Justice Cardozo
has reminded us, "the separation of powers between Executive and Congress
is not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic vigor. "24
Ground for attack has also been found in the deeply embedded, even
if erroneously introduced, maxim delegata potestas non potest delegari.25
Professor Woodbine of Yale has discovered and Mr. Patrick Duff of
Cambridge has agreed that this maxim "owes its origin to medieval com-
mentators on the Digest and Decretals, and its vogue in the common law
to the carelessness of a sixteenth century printer."2 Its doubtful parentage
has, however, not affected its virility. The argument runs, as it concerns
our topic, that powers delegated in the Constitution to one of the three
branches of the government cannot in turn be delegated to another branch
22. TIm FEDERALIST, No. 47 (1788).
23. Referring to the doctrine of the separation of powers, Frankfurter and Landis
wrote in 1924, "That doctrine embodies cautions against tyranny in government through
undue concentration of power. The environment of the Constitution, the debates at
Philadelphia, the writings in support of the adoption of the Constitution, unite in proof
that the true meaning which lies behind 'the separation of powers' is fear of the absorp-
tion of one of the three branches of government by another. As a principle of
statesmanship the practical demands of government preclude its doctrinaire application."
Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010,
1012-13 (1924). A.A. Berle, Jr. had said in 1917, " ... it is necessary to develop
statutory construction in connection with the constitution to the end that the com-
mission may be checked at the point where its tyranny may begin." Berle, supra note 2,
at 448. "[he framers feared tyranny, and the theories of Montesquieu were accepted
by them and by courts as the final word of political wisdom." Cheadle, The Delegation
of Legislative Functions, 27 YALE L.J. 892, 893 (1918).
24. Dissenting in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935).
25. For an able discussion see Foster, The Delegation of Legislative Power to
Administrative Officers, 7 ILL. L. REv. 397 (1913). See also Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation
of Legislative Powers, 47 COL. L. REv. 359, 561 (1947).
26. See Duff, Delegata Potestas non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Con-
stitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 172-3 (1929).
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or to an administrative agency.27 Sugden,28 Kent29 and Story 0 all seem to
base the maxim on the reasoning that the original delegation of power
usually rests upon a personal trust and confidence reposed in the agent to
whom the powers are given, which confidence and trust may be defeated
by sub-delegation to another not chosen by the principal. Story, however,
admitted exceptions where "from the express language used, or from the
fair presumptions, growing out of the particular transaction, or of the
usage of trade, a broader power was intended to be conferred on the agent,"
i.e., the power to sub-delegate. Again, it should be pointed out that we
are here dealing in this challenge with a maxim of common law and not
with an express prohibition of the Constitution itself.
From the point of view of the practical operation of government, it
has been vigorously argued that it is inefficient, if not impossible, for the
legislature to deal in minute detail with all the complicated problems
presented to it; that it must resort to subordinate and specialized agencies
to implement the policies which it lays down.3' It is also argued that the
Constitution does not prohibit cooperation or coordination among the
various branches of the government; that such is indeed necessary if the
government is to discharge the responsibility placed upon it. It has been
maintained that the evil from which the maxim is to protect us is not the
intelligent use by the legislature of aids to its task wherever it can find
them, but the abdication or delegation by the legislature of the legislative
power itself.
There would be little merit and less truth in asserting that expressed
judicial opinion on this point has been at all times clear and uniform.
One senses the courts' cautious case by case approach, seeking some firm
ground for distinction. The early landmark cases in the Supreme Court
seem to announce firmly that there can be no delegation of legislative
27. As John Locke expressed it, "these are the bounds which the trust that it put in
them by society and the law of God and Nature have set to the legislative power of every
commonwealth in all forms of government. * * * the legislature neither must nor can
transfer the power of making law to anybody else or place it anywhere but where the people
have." LocxE, CIvIL GovERNMErNT 142 (1821).
28. SUCDEN, TRATISE ON POWERS 144 (1st ed. 1808).
29. KENT, COMMENTARIES 633 (lst ed. 1827).
30. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 13 (1839).
31. Chief justice Taft in responding to resolutions offered on the death of Chief
Justice White said, "The Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to exercise
powers the conferring of which by Congress would have been, perhaps, thought in the
earlier days of the Republic to violate the nile that no legislative power can be delegated.
But the inevitable progress and exigencies of government, and the utter inability of Con-
gress to give the time and attention indispensable to the exercise of these powers in detail
forced the modification of the rule. Similar necessity caused Congress to create other
bodies with analogous relations to the existing legislative, executive and judicial machinery
of the Federal Government and these in due course came under the examination of this
court. Here was a new field of administrative law which needed a knowledge of govern-
ment and an experienced understanding of our institutions safely to define and declare.
The pioneer work of Chief Justice White in this field entitles him to the gratitude of
his countrymen." 257 U.S. xxv-xxvi (1922).
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power by Congress to the Executive,32 but that legislative acts which
provide for suspension of the law when the Executive finds an event to
have occurred, or a condition of affairs to exist are not delegations to him
of legislative power and hence do not offend the maxim. 3 Some twenty
years of experience later, the Supreme Court was asked to pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to
make rules and regulations for the protection of public forests and forest
reservations from destruction by fire and depredation and providing that
violations of such rules or regulations would be crimes. 4 The court con-
sidered that this was not a delegation of legislative power since the subjects
as to which the Secretary could regulate were defined.85 Another fifteen
years passed and we find the Supreme Court, with reference to legislation
providing for the cooperation of the Congress and Executive in the so-called
flexible tariff provisions, stating that "in determining what it (the legisla-
ture) may do in seeking assistance from 'another branch, the extent and
character of the assistance must be fixed according to common sense and
the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination."36 In each of
these cases, the Court upheld the acts and distinguished that which was
done from delegation of powers. It was in the Hampton case that the Court
seems to have indicated a new line of reasoning when it wrote that "if
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to fix rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."3 7
In the Panama case, we find the majority opinion stating that "the
Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others,
the essential legislative functions with which it is vested," 38 and again the
Court wrote that if the challenged action were held valid then "it would
be idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations upon the
power of Congress to delegate its law-making function."39 The use of the
terms "essential" and "limitations" seems to indicate that the Court may
be willing to sanction some delegations but not others. Mr. Justice Cardozo,
dissenting in the Panama case, was of the opinion that in applying the
maxim "there must be sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of
adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of government which
32. See for example the majority opinion of Mr. justice Harlan and the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Lamar in Field v. Clark, 146 U.S. 649 (1892). For discussion of
the early cases see Whiteside, Delegata Potestas non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of Amer-
ican Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 176 et seq. (19291.
33. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); The Cargo of the Brig Aurora, Bnside
Claimant v. United States, 7 Cranch 382 (U.S. 1813).
34. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
35. Although the district judge had written, "if this does not necessarily involve a
delegation of legislative power, it is difficult to conceive of a statute challengeable on that
ground." United States v. Grimaud, 170 Fed. 205, 209 (S.D. Cal. 1909).
36. J.WV. Hampton, Jr. Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
37. Id. at 409 (italics ours).
38. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (italics ours).
39. Id. at 430 (italics ours).
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cannot foresee today the developments of tomorrow in their infinite
variety."40
The question now became: what protection or safeguards shall be.
required in such permissible "delegations" to insure against tyranny or
arbitrariness of action? Mr. Justice Cardozo spoke of the fact that where
discretion was entrusted by the legislature to an agency, it must not be
"unconfined and vagrant." 41 It must be "canalized within banks that keep
it from overflowing." 42 He was of the opinion that the act challenged in
the Panama case was so canalized, but that the NIRA, challenged in the
Schechter case, constituted "delegation run riot." 48 The question was still:
what banks does a canal require? Chief Justice Stone, in the Yakus case,
considered that the "essentials of the legislative function are the determina-
tion of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a
defined and binding rule of conduct. '44 This the legislature must do. If
this be done, then it is no objection that such legislative command becomes
effective only when a designated administrative agency determines from
relevant data that certain conditions or facts exist. Nor is it a valid objec-
tion that the determining of such facts or conditions involves the exercise
of administrative judgment.4 , The role of the court is seen to be that of
deciding whether the challenged legislation laid down sufficient standards
for the guidance of the administrator so that his acts can be tested in such
a way as to insure that the will of Congress has been obeyed. Thus one of
the banks of the canal became "standards."
The other bank of the canal may be said to be "safeguards." The
notion appears to be that if the legislature has exercised its essential func-
tion by laying down policy and standards for the guidance of the admin-
istrator, and if in addition there exist adequate safeguards as checks upon
arbitrary or misused power, then tyranny is in check and the individual
protected. The spelling out of these requirements of safeguards and
standards may in a sense be called the development of "checks and balances"
within the constitutional framework to apply to the constitutionally-unpro-
40. Id. at 440. Actually here Mr. Justice Cardozo was treating the related problem
of separation of powers. As Chief Justice Vhite had written earlier, " ... to deny
the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount to declaring that
the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be effica-
ciously exerted." Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904). See also Mr. Justice
Harlan's statement ' . . .indeed, it is not too much to say that a denial to Congress of
the right, under the constitution, to delegate the power to determine some fact or the
state of things upon which the enforcement of its enactment depends, would be to 'stop
the wheels of government' and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct of
the public business." Union Bridge Company v. United States 204 U.S. 364 (1906).
41. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra note 38.
42. Ibid.
43. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
44. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 424 (1944).
45. Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage and lour Adm'r, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941).
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vided-for "fourth branch of government."6 The nature of the safeguards
required may vary with the particular problems presented to the court,
but in the main they consist of such devices as judicial review, requirement
of findings, and notice and hearing to the parties concerned.
This brings us to the important question of "due process." Even where
the administrative process has survived the attacks made upon it that it is
an unconstitutional fourth arm of government and that it violates the
constitutional concepts of separation and non-delegation of powers, it has
still to meet the vigorous challenge that it is in violation of the due process
of law clauses of the Constitution as found in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. This attack has taken at least two forms: first, that the
statute under which the administrative process operates is unconstitutional
in that it fails to provide for due process of law; 47 secondly, that the
administrative process in operation does not accord due process of law.48
The former is essentially the argument of a lack of sufficient safeguards:
the latter goes to the heart of the question of arbitrary, capricious "Star
Chamber"49 exercises of power.
The idea is deeply engrained in our thought that no person shall be
deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. The
ratification of the Constitution guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment pro-
tection to this right against acts of the federal government. ihe war which
tested the Union brought in its wake the guarantee by the Fourteenth
Amendment of this right against acts of the state governments. There has
been widespread acknowledgment of the existence of this right: the extent
of the guarantees has been less generally agreed upon. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has written recently, "The faculties of the Due Process Clause
may be indefinite and vague, but the mode of their ascertainment is not
self-willed. In each case 'due process of law' requires an evaluation based
on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced
order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of
46. "The power of the courts to declare laws and delegated legislative action void
for unconstitutionality is a unique feature of American constitutional law. The exercise of
this authority stabilizes our institutions and checks the transitory ebullitions of temporary
majorities. The courts thus safeguard the rights of life, liberty and property which are
included in that pursuit of happiness for which governments are instituted among men.
So long as the power remains, it is to be exercised and not abdicated; exercised not arbi-
trarily, but as a check and balance on arbitrary power and with the breadth and comprehen-
sion of statesmen dealing with the supreme law, not with the meticulousness of an inferior
judge construing a city ordinance." Address of Cuthbert W. Pound, THE GRowTH OF
AMERICAN AnMINISTRATIVE LAW 131 (1923). See also RoscoE POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 26 (1942), " ...to admit that development of the administrative process is neces-
sary does not involve admitting that it should be free of checks such as a due balance
between the general security and the individual life has led us to impose on both the
legislative and judicial process."
47. For example, see Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
48. See discussion in Opp Cotton Mills Inc. v. Wage and Hour Adm'r, supgra note 45.
49. This slogan, dating back to Tudor days, was used by the court in the case of
Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Conun'n, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
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conflicting claims * * * on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly
mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in any
progressive society."8 0 At this point it should be stated that in this essay
we are concerned with the requirements of due process in the administra-
tive process, although we must be aware that our answer to this question
depends to a large extent upon the wider reaches of the development of
the doctrine surrounding due process.51
It is usual to give "due process" an ancestry at least as far back as
Magna Carta, although it cannot be denied that the forms in which due
process has been carried out have varied from age to age.52 No one has
been antiquarian enough to claim that due process in this twentieth century
should slavishly follow the forms in vogue and use in the twelfth century.
The Supreme Court has reminded us that "to believe that the judicial
exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing 'due process of law' at
some fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the most important
aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines
and not for judges."55 Again, Mr. Justice Frankfurter writes, ". . . due
process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those
personal immunities which, as Justice Cardozo twice wrote for this court,
are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental' * * * or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' "54 Or again, it is referred to as protection of "those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples."55 The problem is of course the rendering of these fine
phrases into concrete action. What are the canons of fair play and decency?
What is the summarized constitutional guarantee?
The application of the test of due process to the administrative process
was attended by some of the difficulties inherent in the provisions of the
new Japanese Constitution 0 guaranteeing due process. What is due process
as applied to a new institution? Over a long period of time and not without
50. Rochin v. California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 209 (1952).
51. "But constitutional limitations on the power of government are self-imposed
restrictions upon the will of the people and qualify the despotism of the majority. Such
limitations do not yield to strong opinions merely. They are incorporated in the funda-
mental law to restrict arbitrary legislative power. They forbid government to take from
the owner without compensation whatever private right to control the use of his property
the many may earnestly desire to deprive him of. Isolated expressions of the courts may
suggest that whatever the legislature enacts on grounds of public policy should be sustained,
but the courts may not uphold the exercise of arbitrary power. What is arbitrary and
what is beneficent must be decided bycommon sense applied to a concrete set of facts."
Cuthbert XV. Pound, supra note 46, at 116. See also RoscoE POUND, op. cit. Su/na note
46, at 100-101.
52. See Mcllwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 COL. L. REv. 27 (1914).
53. Rochin v. California, supra note 50, at 209.
54. Id. at 208.
55. Ibid.
56. "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal
penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law." JAPANESE CowsT.
Art. 31, promulgated November 3, 1946.
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controversy, the courts have worked out a concept of judicial due process.
There has also been developed in less elaborate form a concept of legislative
and executive due process as approved by the courts. These three branches
of government had, however, been established in the Constitution as part
and parcel of the organic law which contained the due process requirement.
The administrative process was neither completely contemplated by the
Constitution nor expressly provided for by it or its amendments. The single
guiding star was the proposition that reason and experience dictated that
the government ought not to be permitted to accomplish by the indirect
means of the administrative process that which it was expressly prohibited
from doing directly, namely, depriving citizens of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
Several avenues of approach were open to the courts in this matter.
One was to say that wherever the court was called upon to pass upon acts
done by the administrative process, it would apply in testing the validity of
such acts the specific requirements of judicial due process. It was pointed
out by the opponents of this view that to a considerable extent the admin-
istrative process bad grown up as a reaction to cumbersome and technical
court rules which had rendered the judiciary unable to meet modem
problems;51 that if judicial methods were to be required in the administra-
tive process, this would "hamstring" its operation.58 It was further pointed
out that if the legislature had wished to create new courts, it could have
done so, but that instead it had created administrative agencies which were
not courts. 9 The proponents of this first approach pointed out that only
through the time-honored judicial due process could the rights of individuals
be protected adequately and the danger of arbitrary action be avoided.
A second approach favored by many was that since within the admin-
istrative process were contained some functions which were "quasi-judicial,"
some which were "quasi-legislative" and some "quasi-executive," courts in
testing the validity of administrative action would first determine the
precise function involved, i.e., legislative or judicial, and then apply to it
the proper due process concept.0 Against this view it was argued that it
ignored the essential unity and unique mission of the administrative process
and would necessitate a compartmentalization of action which did not exist
and would be inefficient in operation.0' In support of this approach, it
57. "Characteristics arising from the so-called rigidity and formality of the judicial
process are commonly stated to be factors leading to the rejection of the judicial for the
administrative process." GELLUORN, oP. cit. supra note 1, at 14. See also LANDIS, oP.
cit. supra note 11, at 30.
58. For example, see Holmes' method in Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441
(1915).
59. See particularly Landis' appraisal as summarized. LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 46.
60. Such seems to have been the approach in The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S.
564, 583 (1926).
61. "The dominant theme in the administrative structure is thus determined not pri-
marily by political conceptualism but rather by concern for an industry whose economic
health has become a responsibility of government." LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 12.
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was urged that such a requirement would aid in eliminating from the
administrative process some of that blending of functions, e.g., prosecuting
and judging, which had done much to create resentment against the
process.6
2
It was also open to the court to take a third approach, namely, to treat
the administrative process as sui generis despite its rather irregular birth and
to apply to it tests which might be called "administrative due process."63
One version of this approach might be to accept as determinative of
administrative due process the rules and procedures set down by each
agency. An obvious difficulty in this version was that only a few of the
agencies had published rules, while the great bulk of them either had no
specific rules at all or operated under rules which were not available to the
general public.64 This defect has now in large part been remedied."5 A
further version was for the court to elaborate the requirements of adminis-
trative due process in specific cases. Still a further possibility was to provide
by legislation a basic due process requirement to be followed by all agencies.
This struggle over the issue of due process was no academic debate
but one of the most heated political controversies in our history. Today it
has largely cooled, but from the early thirties until the middle forties the
contest effectively divided political and legal opinion. The rapid increase
in administrative power under President Roosevelt and the "New Deal,"
the open antagonism between the President and the Supreme Court, the
reaching of the government's hand into hitherto sacrosanct areas of private
business, the sometimes over-zealous activities of the administrators; all
these and more raised the cry of "bureacratic tyranny." The Walter-Logan
Bill, 66 backed by the American Bar Association, which measure sought to
"judicialize" the administrative process, passed the Congress but was vetoed
by the President. 7 Public sentiment was also roused by the debated ques-
62. These arguments are considered by Gellhorn. See GELLIUORN, Op. Cit. supra
note 1, at 25-29. See REP. PRESIDENT'S COM M. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANACEMENT 40
(1937), " . . . the same men are obliged to serve both as prosecutors and as judges.
This not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness.
Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of
being rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the Commission, in the role of
prosecutor, presented to itself."
63. As the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee said in discussing the bill
which later became the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, " ...we have set up a
fourth order in the tri-partite plan of Government which was initiated by the founding
fathers of our democracy. They set up the executive, the legislative, and the judicial
branches; but since that time we have set up a fourth dimension, if I may so term it,
which is now popularly known as administrative in nature. So we have the legislative, the
executive, the judicial and the administrative." 92 CoNC. REc. 2148 (March 12, 1946).
64. See Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law-A Plea for Better Publica-
tion of Executive Legislation, 48 HARv. L. REV. 198 (1934).
65. See The Federal Register Act, 4 GEo. WAsh. L. REV. 268 (1936); ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT, § 3, 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1946).
66. SEN. Doec No. 915, favorably reported to the Senate in 1939 and H.R. 6324,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
67. In vetoing the Walter-Logan bill, President Roosevelt called attention to the
fact that he had earlier appointed a committee "to review the entire administrative
process" which was "to recommend improvements, including the suggestion of any
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tion of the President's power to remove the Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission on the ground that they did not see eye to eye on economic
matters.08 In England, the Lord Chief Justice had written a book in which
lie characterized the administrative process as "The New Despotism."6
The Supreme Court, with changing personnel as the result of the President's
retirement plan for the justices, was shifting ground. President Roosevelt
in 1939 had acted to appoint, at the suggestion of the Attorney General, a
committee to undertake a study of the whole area of administrative agen-
cies.70 The committee was headed by the Attorney General and its work
extended over a period of several years.7
The result of all this activity was the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, enacted into law on June 11, 1946.72 It was almost inevitable that the
final version of this Act would be a compromise measure. It did not
satisfy those who saw in the administrative process a new despotic challenge
to free government and private initiative.73 Nor did it satisfy those who
wished to keep the process relatively free from court interference.74 Pro-
fessor Frankfurter, as he then was, had counselled some years earlier that
"in a field as vast and unruly as contemporary Administrative Law we must
be wary against premature generalization and merely formal system." 75
The passage of years and the rapid growth of the process had caused others
to see in it a Paul Bunyan-like child quite ready for discipline.m
The theoretical problem was the determination of the controls neces-
sary to safeguard the rights of individuals and businesses in their contact
with the administrative process, while at the same time recognizing and
needed legislation." He said that he "should desire to await their report and recon-
mendations before approving any measure in this complicated field." H.R. Doe. No.
986, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3, 4 (1940).
68. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
69. LORD HEWART OF BURY, THE NEw DESPOTISM (1929).
70. The creation of such a committee had been suggested to the President by the
Attorney General in December, 1938. The President agreed to its appointment by letter
of February 16, 1939.
71. The Final Report was made in 1941. SEN. Doc. No. 8.
72. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1946). The intervening years between
1941 and 1946 found Congress concerned with other pressing matters in Europe and
the Pacific.
73. Mr. Gwynne of Iowa said, "Some of you who have been very much interested
in this subject over the years may read this bill with a certain amount of disappointment.
You will regret that the bill does not go further. I am frank to say that I have these
same feelings myself. Nevertheless * * * it will become the much needed start along the
road I am so anxious to have us travel." House of Representatives Proceedings of
May 24, 1946. See also Walkup, The Administrative Procedure Act, 34 CFo. L.J. 457,
476 (1946).
74. See Blachly and Oatman, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 34 CEO.
L.J. 407 (1946).
75. F1-RANKFURTER, Preface, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1932).
76. "We have in general the materials and the facts at hand. I think the time
is ripe for some measure of control and prescription by legislation. I cannot agree that
there is anything inherent in the subject of administrative procedure, however complex
it may be, which defies workable codification." Excerpt from Letter of Attorney General
to the Chairmen of the Judiciary Committees of both Houses of the Congress. SEN.
REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 37-8 (1945).
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preserving the special functions in our society usefully performed by these
administrative agencies. The practical problem lay in discovering some
basic propositions upon which Congress and the President could agree
and which it was hoped would prove acceptable to the judiciary. There is
no wish here to go into the details of the Administrative Procedure Act.
It must suffice by way of introduction to point out some of its salient
features, although the Act itself is best regarded as an outline of minimum
essential rights and procedures.
The Act requires agencies to state and publish formally the procedures
and methods used by the agency as well as any substantive rules adopted
as authorized by law and any statements of general policy or interpretations
formulated and adopted for the guidance of the public.7 Certain exceptions
are made where secrecy is properly involved78 or public interest not con-
cerned. 7 Once published these become the measure of required procedure. 0
Since much of the objection to the administrative process had been levelled
at its so-called "Star Chamber" methods in that the procedure by which
it acted was not known except by the agency itself and was sometimes
changed even during the course of a proceeding, it was hoped that this
new requirement would go far to dispel some of the fear of these "unpre-
dictable" agencies.9 ' The Act then proceeded to draw careful distinctions
between the so-called "legislative" functions performed by administrative
agencies, which the Act terms "rule-making,"8' 2 and the "judicial" functions,
which the Act refers to as "adjudication."8 18 Having drawn these distinctions,
the Act requires different procedures for each function with regard to the
important questions of notice and hearing. 4 Next, the Act lays down in
detail the essential requirements for administrative hearings and decisions
and provides that these are to apply in all cases where hearings are provided
for by statute.85 Finally, the Act addresses itself to the problem of judicial
review in regard to such matters as the right to review, acts which can be
77. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 72, § 3.
78. This exception "is not to be construed to defeat the purpose of the remaining
provisions. It would include confidential operations in any agency, such as some of the
aspects of investigating or prosecuting functions of the Secret Service or Federal Bureau
of Investigation, but no other functions in those or other agencies." Senate Committee
Report at p. 12 (1945).
79. This exception likewise "may not be construed to defeat other provisions of
the bill or to permit withholding of information as to operations which remaining
provisions of the section or of the whole bill require to be public or publicly available."
Ibid.
80. "No person shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or pro-
cedure not so published." ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, aunPra note 72, § 3.
81. "Laymen and lawyers alike are baffled by a lack of published information to
which they can turn when confronted with an administrative problem." FINAL REP.
ArT'y GEN. COMM. An. PROc. 25 (1941).
82. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 72, § 4.
83. Id. § 5.
84. Particularly, id. §§ 4-6. In fact, however, these requirements are integrated into
the whole thesis of the Act. See Davis, Separation of Functions in Administrative Agen-
cies, 61 HARv. L. REv. 389, 612 (1948).
85. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT, snupra note 72, §§ 7, 8.
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reviewed, interim relief and the scope-of review.88 In summary, it is perhaps
fair to say that "administrative due process," as conceived by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, went quite far in committing the administrative
process to "judicialization,"8' 7 but this came at a time when the Supreme
Court had come to look upon the administrative process with a more
understanding eye. 8
III
The administrative process has now apparently entered a new phase of
its growth, a sort of levelling off or stabilizing period. We still do not
know whether it is a headless fourth branch of government or a mdlange of
three, but somehow the fire has gone out of the question. Even candidates
for political office seem to have decided that it is of doubtful political
wisdom to belabor the Securities and Exchange Commission or the National
Labor Relations Board as "bureaucracies" engaged in tyrannical exploits.
They seem to have joined the respectable company of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. There is the suspicion that the Administrative
Procedure Act was merely the dotting of i's and the crossing of t's on an
already completed sentence. Even the names of the chief administrators
of the agencies are no longer so much on the lips of the public. Attacks
upon government spending may curtail the extent of their activities, but
the function is recognized and, apart from a radical change in our govern-
ment, it is likely to be so.
The problem which now requires attention is on the personnel level.
The administrative function has been accepted as legitimate: minimum
due process has been prescribed; rules and regulations have been made
public; public fear and indignation has to a degree abated. But the success
of administration, be it of a trust, a corporation or of government, depends
not only upon the rules and the published methods, but upon the calibre
and the conscience of the administrator. The most perfect techniques and
methods may be set at naught by the human element of the administrator.
Recent disclosures of lapsed moral and ethical standards in certain govern-
ment officials have brought the searchlight of attention upon the problem
of personnel.
The Administrative Procedure Act in at least two instances laid stress
upon the personnel element; once when it provided for separation of the
investigative and prosecuting functions from those of adjudication, 9 and
86. Id. § 10.
87. 'The tendency in America has been towards the judiciaisation of these forces
of social control-toward fitting them into the existing constitutional framework, and,
above all, toward their subordination to law." Schwartz, The American Administrative
Procedure Act, 63 L.Q. REv. 43 (1947).
88. The administrative process itself had by this time abandoned some of the
practices which had originally served as a basis for legitimate criticism. See Nathanson,
Some Comments on Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. Rzv. 368, 420 (1946).
89. ADMINISTRiATIVE PROCEDURiE AcT, supra note 72, § 5c,
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once when it provided for examiners under civil serviceY0 This was clear
recognition of the fact that attention must be given to the human-frailty
element in administration. Far too little attention has been given to the
qualifications necessary for sound administration. 1 We have been too
busy with other aspects of the process, It is of course true that the in-
creased number of administrative agencies has vastly swelled the number
of appointments at the dispensing hand of the President. Surprisingly little
has been said about this fact by practical politicians or theorists.
It may well be that the Congress, which presently seems concerned
with legislative prescription of public and official ethics, might with profit
explore, with political scientists and personnel experts, ways and means
for securing in administration the most capable and competent personnel.
The old rule that in government as in business, sound, responsible manage-
ment is the key to the success or failure of the venture still applies with
full vigor.
90. Id. § 11.
91. See GELLHORN, Op. Cit. Sujrat note 1 at 65, 73. See also, Ballantine, Administra-
tive Agencies and the Law, 24 A.B.A.J. 109, 112 (1938), "if the Government service
comes to be made up in large part of highly competent, disinterested and permanent
personnel, not only will there be better and fairer decisions in particular cases, but we
may achieve the shaping of Government policies on firm ground rather than on grounds
of prejudice and political expediency."
